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a b S t R a c t
The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus’ specific usage of the 
concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting 
that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom 
should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus’ intellec-
tualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been 
discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I 
will suggest that those passages are best interpreted as rhetorical or, better, peda-
gogical expressions of Epictetus’ strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology 
of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to 
certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise 
clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus’ intellectualism concerning 
the psychology of action.
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R e S u m e n
El artículo tiene por objetivo clarificar algunos aspectos del uso específico que 
realiza Epicteto a lo largo de las Dissertationes del concepto de proairesis. Esto se 
realizará sugiriendo que ciertas expresiones problemáticas referidas a la proairesis 
y su libertad deben ser entendidas como expresiones retórico-pedagógicas del 
intelectualismo de Epicteto. Me concentraré fundamentalmente en una serie de 
pasajes problemáticos que han sido discutidos por varios comentadores en relación 
con el concepto de proairesis, y sugeriré que esos pasajes deben ser interpretados 
como expresiones retóricas o, mejor, pedagógicas de enfoque estrictamente inte-
lectualista de la psicología humana que propone Epicteto. La interpretación que 
propondré hace innecesario el recurso a ciertas interpretaciones de esos parajes 
que amenazan con oscurecer el panorama claro de la acción humana ofrecido 
por la concepción intelectualista de la psicología humana defendida por Epicteto.
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1.
The concept of proairesis in Epictetus has been in the center 
of attention of many of his commentators for the last three de-
cades, and for very good reasons: in the first place, it functions 
as the central axis around which the whole of his psychology 
and his ethical reflections revolve; in the second place, certain 
ambiguities and relative imprecision concerning the concept of 
proairesis sometimes seem to hinder a coherent reconstruction of 
his psychology of action, which makes the endeavor of reaching 
and accurate definition of the term clearly worthwhile; lastly, the 
overall picture that we may construe of Epictetus’ philosophy will 
vary perceivably depending on the particular reading we adopt of 
the concept of proairesis1. 
Fortunately, we have come a long way in the understanding 
of Epictetus’ psychology of action since, vg. the 19th century 
translations of proairesis as “free will”, and a clearer and more 
accurate picture of Epictetus’ psychology of action has emerged 
from a series of studies that have been published in the last two 
decades dealing (directly or indirectly) with the concept of proai-
resis. Although I doubt whether a single, unified definition of the 
term will ever be completely accurate, given the complexity of its 
semantic reference, I think that those studies have progressively 
put us in a better position to grasp the full dimensions of the term. 
In what follows, I will focus on a series of problematic passages 
that have been discussed by several commentators concerning 
1 The problematic character of  the concept of  proairesis can be easily perceived 
by considering the numerous translations it has been given since the first Renaissance 
editions of  the Enchiridion. A partial list of  modern translations of  the term can be 
found in Seddon (2005, p. 209). 
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the notion of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are 
best interpreted as rhetorical or, better, pedagogical expressions 
of Epictetus’ intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. 
This will, I hope, bring to light the richness not only of Epictetus’ 
intellectualism but also of some of the rhetorical-pedagogical 
strategies he puts into play throughout the Discourses.
2.
Epictetus’ position on the value of Rhetoric, considered mainly 
as the question of style in writing and speaking (or lecturing), can 
be clearly grasped form the Discourses:
This faculty of  speech and of  the adornment of  language, if  it 
really is a separate faculty, what else does it do, when discourse 
arises about some topic, but ornament and compose the words, 
as hairdressers do the hair? But whether it is better to speak than 
to keep silence, and to do so in this way, or in that, and whether 
this is appropriate or not appropriate, and the proper occasion 
and utility of  each action what else tells us all this but the faculty 
of  proairesis? […] When I say this, let no one suppose that I am 
bidding you neglect speech, any more than I bid you neglect 
eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or dress, or shoes. But if  you ask 
me “What, then, is the highest of  all things?”, what shall I say? 
The faculty of  eloquence? I cannot; but rather that of  proairesis, 
when it becomes a right proairesis. For it is this which uses not 
only that faculty of  eloquence but also all the other faculties both 
small and great2. (2. 23. 14-28)3
2 ἡ δὲ φραστικὴ αὕτη καὶ καλλωπιστικὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, εἴ τις ἄρα ἰδία δύναμις, τί 
ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἤ, ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ λόγος περί τινος, καλλωπίζει τὰ ὀνομάτια καὶ συντίθησιν 
ὥσπερ οἱ κομμωταὶ τὴν κόμην; πότερον δ› εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ σιωπῆσαι καὶ οὕτως ἄμεινον 
ἢ ἐκείνως καὶ τοῦτο πρέπον ἢ οὐ πρέπον, καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν χρείαν τίς 
ἄλλη λέγει ἢ ἡ προαιρετική. […] ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα λέγω, μή τις οἰέσθω ὅτι ἀμελεῖν ὑμᾶς 
ἀξιῶ φράσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν οὐδ› ὤτων οὐδὲ χειρῶν οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδ› ἐσθῆτος 
οὐδ› ὑποδημάτων. ἀλλ› ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ ‘τί οὖν ἐστι κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων;’, τί εἴπω; τὴν 
φραστικήν; οὐ δύναμαι· ἀλλὰ τὴν προαιρετικήν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γένηται. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ 
κἀκείνῃ χρώμενον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις καὶ μικραῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυνάμεσιν·
3 I follow Oldfather’s (1961) translation with minor modifications. 
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This is certainly not an attitude of theoretical contempt, but 
neither is it an encouragement to engage in rhetorical studies. 
Given that Epictetus reduces Rhetoric to the question of adorn-
ment of speech, its value can only be secondary4, and as such, it 
should not take up the little time we have in life (which should 
be devoted, first and foremost, to our moral/epistemic progress). 
Yet, one of the salient features of the Discourses is precisely the 
wide array of rhetorical devices that Epictetus puts into play in 
each of his interactions with either real individuals or fictitious 
characters. This is evidence enough that the question of style was 
by no means a secondary one to him. Given that his primary 
objective consists in moving (kineō) the audience in order to make 
them realize by themselves the correct path to freedom and virtue, 
and given that this can only be done through speech, the mastery 
of the different ways in which his listeners can be moved to assent 
to certain impressions is a task that is far from indifferent from the 
point of view of the effectiveness of Epictetus’ pedagogical praxis. 
He is well aware that, when it comes to the issue of persuasion, 
his own speech must be able to adapt itself to the disposition of 
his listeners (cfr. 2. 12), which implies testing different variations 
in the form of addressing one and the same issue, resorting to rhe-
torical devices and even playing different parts in the interaction 
with his students. This need to resort to different persuasive stra-
tegies does not imply any contradiction with the passage quoted 
above: the secondary value assigned there to Rhetoric concerns 
the question of mere eloquence (the ornamentation of speech 
for aesthetic purposes, the selection of a certain already publicly 
acknowledged style of declamation, etc.). Epictetus’ actual usage 
of rhetorical devices has nothing to do with eloquence or style, 
4  One might even wonder if  this is not merely a concession to his students. 
However, this is a frequent strategy in the Discourses: although X (be it the faculty of  
speech, certain external things, or our body) is indifferent to our virtue and happiness, 
it does have value (although a secondary one), and should not, therefore, be neglected 
(cfr. 1. 2. 37; 4. 11). 
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but with the overall pedagogical aim of his philosophy5. Taking 
into consideration this specific dimension, I suggest, can shed light 
on a series of Epictetus’ problematic expressions concerning the 
notion of proairesis.
3.
Much more than is the case with Aristotle, Epictetus’ concept of 
proairesis presents the reader with numerous interpretative difficul-
ties. The most simple and pressing question springs inevitably after 
reading the Discourses: what is proairesis, and how does it relate to 
the other concepts involved in Epictetus’ psychology of action? 
The difficulties one faces when trying to give a precise answer 
to this question can be briefly stated as follows: i) proairesis often 
seems to be directly or indirectly equivalent to the hēgemonikon; 
ii) proairesis appears to designate alternatively a single act of the 
soul and/or one of its faculties; iii) proairesis sometimes seems to be 
directly or indirectly equivalent to our opinions or beliefs (doxa/
dogmata)6; iv) proairesis sometimes seems to be unconditionally 
free and sometimes not.
Although the last issue will be dealt with later, a few observa-
tions are in place concerning the first three difficulties. As regards 
(i), Anthony Long has offered a persuasive solution to the rela-
tionship between the hēgemonikon and proairesis: 
Although they overlap in their referent, so far as human beings 
are concerned, hēgemonikon does not mean rationality; it is a 
5 The relevance for Epictetus of  this task becomes evident in 1. 4. 26-7, where 
he admits that if  deception were the only way to persuade him of  the truth of  the 
distinction between what depends on us and what doesn’t, he would be willing to be 
deceived: “If  indeed one had to be deceived into learning that among things external 
and independent of  our proairesis none concerns us, I, for my part, should consent to 
a deception which would result in my living thereafter serenely and without turmoil”. 
6 “It is your opinion which compelled you, that is, proairesis compelled proairesis 
(οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτ› ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις)” (1. 17. 25).
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term that applies to the souls of  animals who lack rationality as 
well as to human beings. […] Rather than opting for synonymy, 
we should take proairesis to refer to the human mind in just those 
capacities or dispositions that Epictetus constantly maintains to 
be completely “up to us” and free from external constraint. […] 
Epictetus chose the term proairesis to pick out the human mind in 
this more restricted aspect: “us”, so to say, in just those respects 
that are dependent on nothing that we cannot immediately jud-
ge, decide, and will, entirely by and for ourselves. (Long, 2002, 
pp. 212-213)
Considering the second difficulty, it must be admitted that 
our demand for clarification might be taken to be anachronistic, 
since in the Roman period there is evidence close to Epictetus that 
the need to distinguish between a single act of the soul and the 
capacity of the soul which is put into action was not considered 
mandatory, as can be seen in Seneca’s or in Lucretius’ use of 
voluntas. Although I believe that Gourinat (2005) has succeeded 
in distinguishing both senses in some key passages, I believe that 
some more clarification on this distinction (which is beyond my 
present objective) is still pending. What is clear, in any case, is 
that neither in the Discourses nor in the Enchiridion does proairesis 
designate at the same time a faculty and its actions, but rather that 
Epictetus uses the same term to designate now one, now the other 
(without specifying, regrettably, which one he is referring to). 
Contrary to the relationship of proairesis and hēgemonikon, 
the relationship between proairesis and doxa/dogmata (iii), is not 
one of subsumption of one concept under the other, but rather a 
bi-directional relation: on the one hand, every opinion we hold 
(i.e., every act of assent to a certain impression) gives shape to 
the epistemic state of our proairesis; on the other, as has been fre-
quently noticed, every act of assent is determined by the present 
epistemic state of our proairesis. In other words: while the workings 
of proairesis are a direct and inevitable result of the (set of) opinions 
we hold (or have held in the past), it is the epistemic quality of 
our proairesis (i.e., whether it is perverted, contrary to nature, etc., 
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or not) which determines which opinions we will hold in the fu-
ture. This explains, I believe, why Epictetus is at times relatively 
imprecise in establishing the relationship between both elements. 
What concerns me for the moment, however, is Epictetus’ frequent 
indirect identification between both elements (our proairesis and our 
judgments), which I believe is aimed at emphasizing the epistemic 
element present in every single act of proairesis. As we shall see, 
Epictetus’ endorsement of the intellectualist position inherited 
from the early Stoics is radical: opinions are not only a necessary 
cause for our actions; they are their only possible sufficient cause. 
Whether the rationality that these opinions constitute is perverted 
or not is not relevant to this point: even the most ignorant and 
uncultivated of individuals acts on the basis of rational conside-
rations, which determine his actions in a necessary manner; if 
the individual’s rational capacities are completely distorted, his 
actions will display that same defective quality, but they will, 
nevertheless, be the result of a rational process.
4.
Although the previous difficulties concerning the precise defini-
tion of proairesis (i-iii) can be explained as I have indicated, a few 
passages from the Discourses confront us with additional difficulties 
that have not been dealt with so far:
T1  What can overcome an impulse but another impulse? And 
what can overcome one desire or aversion but another desire or 
aversion? –But, says someone, if  a person subjects me to the fear 
of  death, he compels me (anankazei me).– No, it is not what you 
are subjected to that compels you, but the fact that you think it 
is better for you to do something of  the sort than to die. Once 
more, then, it is your judgment (dogma) which compelled you, 
that is, proairesis compelled proairesis7. (1. 17. 24–27)
7 καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή; τίς δ› ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη 
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T2  Nothing outside the sphere of  proairesis can hamper or injure 
the proairesis; it alone can hamper or injure itself  (he blapsai 
aproaireton ei mē autē heautēn)8. (3. 19. 2)
T3  What is by its very nature capable of  hindering proairesis? Nothing 
that lies outside its sphere, but only itself  when perverted (autē 
d’ heautēn diastrapheira). For this reason proairesis becomes the 
only vice, or the only virtue9. (2.23.19)
All these passages seem to convey, when they are read à la lettre, 
the idea of a dialog or interaction between our proairesis and itself 
or between our proairesis and our self. In a recent article, Richard 
Sorabji (2007) has sought to solve this difficulty by arguing that 
these passages suggest that there is more than one proairesis (as 
there is also more than one self), one of them being correct and 
unperverted, and the other one perverted or impure10. Although 
I believe that this is a reasonable explanation (especially of T3), I 
believe that another approach is possible, which does not require 
that we relate the textual duplication of proairesis to their moral or 
epistemic quality, but rather to the pedagogical aim that that du-
plication is intended to fulfill. That this is so can be clearly seen by 
considering an additional passage that Sorabji has not considered: 
ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις;’ ‘ἄν μοι’, φησί, ‘προσάγῃ θανάτου φόβον, ἀναγκάζει με.’ ‘οὐ τὸ 
προσαγόμενον, ἀλλ› ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ποιῆσαί τι τούτων ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. πάλιν 
οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτ› ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις. 
8 προαίρεσιν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται κωλῦσαι ἢ βλάψαι ἀπροαίρετον εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν.
9 προαίρεσιν δὲ τί ἐμποδίζειν πέφυκεν; ἀπροαίρετον οὐδέν, αὐτὴ δ› ἑαυτὴν 
διαστραφεῖσα. διὰ τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη γίνεται ἢ ἀρετὴ μόνη. 
10 Sorabji partly bases this conclusion in the fact that T3 seems to complement T2.
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T4 –I wish to control your judgments (dogmaton) also–. And who 
has given you this authority? How can you have the power to 
overcome another’s judgments? –By bringing fear to bear upon 
him–. You fail to realize that the judgment overcame itself, it 
was not overcome by something else; and nothing can overcome 
proairesis, but it overcomes itself  (autē heautēn)11. (1. 29. 12)
The argument that lies beneath this imaginary conversation 
seems to have two complementary aspects: in the first place, it 
establishes that nothing external can change the direction of our 
decisions. However, the idea that Epictetus means to stress is 
that whatever decision we make is determined by our holding a 
certain belief (or judgment or opinion) as to the appropriateness of 
that course of action. These two complementary ideas are jointly 
expressed through a frequent pattern throughout the Discourses: 
only X can impede, hinder or overcome X, where X stands alterna-
tively for opinion, proairesis, desire, or impulse12. I consider this to be 
a fundamentally rhetorical pattern: an impulse cannot overcome 
an impulse, proairesis cannot overcome proairesis, and so on, except 
if we consider them as the projections of our judgments (or beliefs 
or opinions)13. In other words, it is only judgments which can 
conquer or defeat other judgments, and that is the only possible 
source of conflict in the soul. This is due to the fact that, according 
to Epictetus’ intellectualist approach to the psychology of human 
action, for there to be an impulse to act, two events must neces-
sarily take place within the mind: an impression has to appear 
to the mind stating that X is true or appropriate (in the case of 
hormetic impressions), and the individual must give assent to that 
11 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἄρχειν θέλω.’ καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν; 
ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἀλλότριον; ‘προσάγων’, φησίν, ‘αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω.’ 
ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐνικήθη· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν. 
12 Cfr., besides T1-T4, 1. 19. 7, 1. 25. 28, 4. 12. 12.
13 This is reinforced by Epictetus’ frequent identification of  proairesis and doxa/
dogmata, which I have already referred to.
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impression (i.e., he must consider it as true, as stating a true state 
of affairs). No human action can possibly take place without the 
occurrence of those two mental events. In other words: no action 
can ensue unless we assent to the idea that it is an appropriate 
course of action.
This being so, how do we account for the problematic expres-
sions we find in T1-T4? I believe that the recurrent pattern “only 
X can hinder (or impede or overcome) X” aims at pointing out, 
resorting to the language of war and of contests (cfr. inter alia, T5; 
1. 1. 23-4; 1. 25. 28; 4. 4. 30; 4. 5. 26; 4. 7. 30; Ench.19), that the 
soul is an arena where the only contestant is oneself. Neither the 
Caesar nor the whole Senate nor any of our closest fellows can 
possibly enter the battle, and only we will be held responsible for 
our failures14 and praised for our victories (4. 12. 7; 4. 13. 8). From 
the perspective of persuasion, this has a clear advantage: given 
that we are not fighting against others, since we (our judgments) 
are the only causes of our having strayed away from virtue and 
happiness, this is a battle that can be definitely won: all we need 
to do is to cast out the tyrants, i.e., to merely realize that nothing 
external to our proairesis can have power over us. In the broader 
context of Epictetus’ pedagogical strategies, the two corollaries of 
this idea (“it is within you that both destruction and deliverance lie”; 
4. 9. 17) give expression to the tension, brilliantly analyzed by 
Kamtekar, between two opposing but complementary strategies 
displayed by Epictetus: on the one hand, his reminder of “our god-
like potential”; on the other, the recognition of our ignorance, of 
“our nearly worthless state” (Kamtekar, 1998, p. 154). Epictetus 
needs to point out to his students that they and they alone are the 
causes of their present miseries, but he also needs to make them 
aware of the fact that their wretched state is something that can 
be surmounted, and this he does by stressing that victory (which 
means, in this case, virtue and absence from perturbations) is 
14 “No one comes to his fall because of  another’s deed” (1. 28. 33).
49
Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich
eidos nº19 (2013) págs. 39-56
issn 2011-7477
at hand. To be sure this is no different from saying (along with 
early Stoics) that the origin of every action lies in the movement 
of the soul through which it assents to the lekton (or lekta) that 
accompanies every phantasia, but the chances of persuading one 
of Epictetus’ young students or an occasional passer-by through 
technical expressions are, compared to the rhetoric of war and 
contests, evidently low; too low to take the risk, considering that 
what is at stake is the possibility of moral progress.
5.
Two other passages from the Discourses which have been conside-
red by Sorabji under the light of the distinction between perverted 
and unperverted proairesis, can be approached instead from the 
perspective of their persuasive function:
T5 If  you are going to honor anything at all outside the sphere 
of  the proairesis, you have destroyed/ruined (apōlesas) your 
proairesis15. (4. 4. 23)
T6 Only consider at what price you sell your proairesis. If  you must 
sell it, man, at least do not sell it cheap16. (1 .2. 33)
It is obvious that proairesis is not something that can be sold 
or destroyed in a literal sense. What, then, does Epictetus have 
in mind? The most logical way to understand both passages is 
evident: whenever we honor something external, we are jeopar-
dizing the natural freedom of proairesis; we are risking becoming 
enslaved by such externals. The second passage seems to imply, 
15 πᾶν ὃ ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς σαυτοῦ τιμήσεις, ἀπώλεσας τὴν προαίρεσιν. Cfr. 
also 1. 25. 3-6, where Epictetus repeats the structure substituting “proairesis” with “what 
is yours” (sautou). 
16 Μόνον σκέψαι, πόσου πωλεῖς τὴν σεαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωπε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, 
μὴ ὀλίγου αὐτὴν πωλήσῃς. 
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more importantly, that it is possible to sacrifice knowingly and 
voluntarily the natural freedom of our proairesis (in exchange for 
some other benefits, such as wealth, reputation, etc.). Whether 
this makes sense within the theoretical framework of Epictetus’ 
psychology is what I will try to analyze.
That an agent can surrender the freedom of his decisions to 
the fluctuations of fortune (through surrendering to a beautiful 
woman, a young man, the Caesar, or the desire for honors and 
reputation) is well attested throughout the whole of Epictetus’ 
discourses and has traditionally been considered one of the central 
motives in his teaching (cfr., besides T5 and T6, 4. 1. 56-57, 4. 4. 
33-34). That is precisely what Long takes T2 to be stating (Long, 
2002, 217). However, there is a decisive issue which has not been 
paid much attention concerning the relationship between two 
fundamental principles found in the Discourses: the first of them is 
Epictetus’ insistence on the natural freedom of proairesis; the second is 
the principle we have just stated, i.e., that an agent can (knowingly 
or unknowingly) surrender the control he has over his decisions. 
This takes us back to the last problem (iv) that I initially marked 
as one of the difficulties one faces when trying to make sense of 
Epictetus’ notion of proairesis: either proairesis is unconditionally 
free (in which case we cannot possibly surrender its control) or, 
on the contrary, its freedom can be sacrificed, sold, destroyed, 
etc. (in which case freedom is not an indelible feature of proairesis 
but rather a state, a disposition or quality that can be lost17). Both 
principles cannot be held together without contradiction. And 
yet, Epictetus certainly seems to do so. Alongside the frequent 
statements concerning the unconditional freedom of proairesis, 
17 The core of  this problem is also instantiated in the conflict that results between 
Epictetus’ conception of  freedom as a factum of  proairesis (a gift from Zeus, etc.), and 
his conception of  freedom as liberation, that is, as a process of  rational purification 
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we find numerous expressions that suggest that that condition 
can in fact be lost:
T7 Who is your master? He who has authority over any of  the things 
upon which you set your heart or which you wish to avoid18. (2. 
2. 26)
T8 You ought to give up everything, your body, your property, your 
reputation, your books, turmoil, office, freedom from office. 
For if  once you swerve aside from this course, you are a slave, 
you are a subject, you have become liable to hindrance and to 
compulsion, you are entirely under the control of  others19. (4. 4. 
33-4; cfr. also 1. 15. 18; 4. 1. 60)
Although both alternatives find support in the Discourses, I 
believe that the scale can be tipped to one side by appealing, once 
again, to the intellectualist basis of Epictetus’ psychology of action: 
if it is true that the only possible source of action is an opinion, a 
belief, or the assent we give to an impression, the second alter-
native must be discarded. If we accepted, on the contrary, that 
certain individuals have surrendered control of their decisions, 
we would be forced to conclude that our actions can, in fact, be 
determined by external factors. But, as has already been stressed, 
external objects cannot possibly determine our actions. When 
we consider something external to be good or bad, it is precisely 
our consideration of them as such that determines our actions, 
not the goodness or badness inherent in the external thing itself: 
T9 –We ought not to look for the reason anywhere outside of  
ourselves, but that in all cases it is one and the same thing that is 
18 τίς δ› ἐστὶ κύριος; ὁ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τινος σπουδαζομένων ἢ ἐκκλινομένων ἔχων 
ἐξουσίαν. 
19 ἀφεῖναί σε δεῖ πάντα, τὸ σῶμα, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὴν φήμην, τὰ βιβλία, θόρυβον, ἀρχάς, 
ἀναρχίαν; ὅπου γὰρ ἂν κλίνῃς, ἐδούλευσας, ὑπετάγης, κωλυτὸς ἐγένου, ἀναγκαστός, 
ὅλος ἐπ› ἄλλοις. 
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the cause of  our doing a thing or of  our not doing it, of  our saying 
things, or of  our not saying them, of  our being elated, or of  our 
being cast down, of  our avoiding things, or of  our pursuing them 
the very thing, indeed, which has even now become a cause of  
my action and of  yours; yours in coming to me and sitting here 
now listening, mine in saying these things. –And what is that?– 
Is it, indeed, anything else than that it seemed to us convenient 
to do this (edoken hemin)? –Nothing–. And supposing that it 
had seemed to us convenient to do something else (allōs hemin 
ephanē), what else would we be doing than that which we seemed 
convenient (to doxan eprattomen)? [ …] It is neither death, 
nor exile, nor toil, nor any such thing that is the cause of  our 
doing, or of  our not doing, anything, but only our suppositions 
and opinions (hypolēpseis kai dogmata). […] Very well, then, 
whenever we do anything wrongly, from this day forth we shall 
ascribe to this action no other cause (aitiasometha) than the 
opinions (to dogma) which led us to do it […] And in the same 
way we shall declare the same thing to be the cause of  our good 
actions. And we shall no longer blame either slave, or neighbor, 
or wife, or children, as being the causes of  any evils to us, since 
we are persuaded that, unless we believe that things are thus-
and-so, we do not perform the corresponding actions20. (1. 11. 
28-37)
We cannot, therefore, voluntarily abrogate our autonomy; we 
cannot even surrender it involuntarily. We are always, necessarily, 
20 οὐκ ἔξω που δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτό, ἀλλ› ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν τι 
ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ λέγειν τινὰ ἢ μὴ λέγειν, τοῦ ἐπαί ρεσθαι ἢ συστέλλεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν τινὰ 
ἢ διώκειν, τοῦθ› ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ γέγονεν αἴτιον, σοὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ 
καθῆσθαι νῦν ἀκούοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν ταῦτα. τί δ› ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ἆρά γε ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἔδοξεν 
ἡμῖν; { – } Οὐδέν. { – } Εἰ δ› ἄλλως ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ δόξαν ἐπράττομεν. [...] καὶ 
ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν 
τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ› ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα. […] οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὴ ὀρθῶς τι πράττωμεν, 
ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιασόμεθα ἢ τὸ δόγμα, ἀφ› οὗ αὐτὸ ἐπράξαμεν. […] 
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς πραττομένων ταὐτὸν τοῦτο αἴτιον ἀποφανοῦμεν. καὶ οὔτ› οἰκέτην 
ἔτι αἰτιασόμεθα οὔτε γείτονα οὔτε γυναῖκα οὔτε τέκνα ὡς αἴτιά τινων κακῶν ἡμῖν γινόμενα 
πεπεισμένοι ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἡμῖν δόξῃ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶναι, οὐ πράττομεν τὰ ἀκόλουθα·
53
Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich
eidos nº19 (2013) págs. 39-56
issn 2011-7477
autonomous; we are always our own masters and we are, to put 
it in Sartrean terms, determined to be free21.
But if this is so, how do we account for Epictetus’ emphasis 
on the surrendering of proairesis? I believe that Epictetus aims to 
emphasize that, although every action is the result of a certain 
judgment, there is one particular judgment that has decisive effects 
on our way of life, on our relationship with what lies outside the 
sphere of our proairesis, and it is the judgment that external things 
have an either positive or negative value. This is the judgment, so to 
speak; it is the Capitol. Although we cannot surrender our capacity 
to make a rational use of impressions, once we have assented to 
the idea that external things are good or bad in themselves, we 
plunge into a mechanism of illusion that redefines from within 
itself the whole of our ethical priorities. The act of assigning value 
to what lies outside the realm of proairesis (which is itself an act of 
our proairesis, i.e., a singular –conscious or unconscious– decision) 
becomes the primary principle (dogma) on which the whole of our 
future decisions will be taken. Although the Caesar’s commands 
cannot possibly cause my actions (or passions), once I have agreed 
to consider wealth and honor as something to be sought, I will be 
forced to bow my head before him and obey his orders.
Moreover, the mechanism we put in motion whenever we 
consider external things are inherently good or evil is completely 
hermetic and cannot possibly overlap with the alternative path 
which is the proper care of our proairesis, since each of these al-
ternatives represent no single, isolated actions and decisions, but 
21 “It is my nature to look out for my own interest. If  it is my interest to have a 
farm, it is my interest to take it away from my neighbor; if  it is my interest to have a 
cloak, it is my interest also to steal it from a bath. This is the source of  wars, seditions, 
tyrannies, plots” (1. 22. 13-14). “This is the nature of  every being, to pursue the good 
and to flee from the evil; and to consider the man who robs us of  the one and invests 
us with the other as an enemy and an aggressor, even though he be a brother, even 
though he be a son, even though he be a father; for nothing is closer kin to us than 
our good. It follows, then, that if  these externals are good or evil, neither is a father 
dear to his sons, nor a brother dear to a brother, but everything on all sides is full of  
enemies, aggressors, slanderers” (4. 5. 30).
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rather two fully divergent ways of life (4. 10. 25). If we start off 
from the consideration of external things as convenient or inconve-
nient, we will be forced to travel a path which leads us away from 
the objective of keeping our proairesis in accordance with nature.
The actual meaning and relevance of Epictetus expressions 
on selling or destroying our proairesis can only be grasped, then, I 
suggest, if we interpret them in terms of the powerful warning 
that it is not a particular decision that is at stake, but rather the 
moral quality of the whole of our subsequent actions, and thus, 
the very possibility of achieving happiness. Once again, the simple 
statement in technical terms of the intellectualist principle could 
hardly put across the moral implications of our decision to value 
externals that Epictetus manages to convey through the recourse 
to amplifications or auxesis such as the ones expressed by the 
image of selling or destroying our proairesis22. However, this is 
not only due to persuasive strength: the intellectualist principle 
states that every action is determined by the opinions or beliefs 
we hold, but it does not entail by itself there are certain judgments 
(such as the act of giving value to externals) that can define our 
whole approach to what lies outside ourselves and thus become 
the initial link in a chain that will necessarily lead to frustration 
and slavery. This is a corollary of the distinction between what 
depends on us and what doesn’t, what should concern us and what 
shouldn’t, and is independent of the intellectualist principle. The 
statement that by valuing externals we are destroying or selling 
our proairesis is perhaps an over dramatization (since we can at 
any moment recover ourselves by tearing down the mask of the 
tyrant), but it certainly succeeds in connecting both ideas in an 
extremely appealing manner and emphasizing the moral weight 
of our everyday decisions.
22 It is true that these amplifications run the risk of  obscuring the fact that the 
vicious actions that derive from a wrong valuation of  externals can be corrected by 
the mere reassessment of  that valuation, to counter which Epictetus resorts to the 
strategy of  stressing our innate resources and our kinship with God.
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6.
I have attempted to shed light on a number of obscure or ambi-
guous expressions concerning the notion of proairesis in Epictetus’ 
Discourses by analyzing them from a rhetorical-pedagogical pers-
pective. Although neither his intellectualism nor the centrality of 
the notion of proairesis within his psychology are features that have 
not been carefully analyzed by other commentators, I believe that 
the interpretation I have proposed of the passages I have dealt with 
here does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of 
those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture 
of human action offered by Epictetus’ intellectualism. Although 
this is a modest result, it brings to light not only how profound and 
systematic Epictetus’ commitment to an intellectualist position 
concerning the psychology of human action was, but also that it 
is against the background of that position that his conception of 
freedom should be interpreted.
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